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PREFACE 
 
  
The ADB Institute aims to explore the most appropriate development paradigms for 
Asia composed of well-balanced combinations of the roles of markets, institutions, and 
governments in the post-crisis period. 
 
Under this broad research project on development paradigms, the ADB Institute 
Research Paper Series will contribute to disseminating works-in-progress as a building 
block of the project and will invite comments and questions. 
 
I trust that this series will provoke constructive discussions among policymakers as 
well as researchers about where Asian economies should go from the last crisis and 
recovery. 
 
 
 
 
Masaru Yoshitomi 
Dean 
ADB Institute 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the role of foreign banks in post-crisis Asia, focusing particularly on 
the four countries most affected by the Asian Crisis of 1997Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand.   
First, using data on the presence of foreign banks via branching as well as subsidiaries, 
the study shows that the presence of foreign banks in the four crisis-hit countries is actually much 
larger than has been previously reported once the presence of foreign branches is accounted for in 
the data.  However, the percentage of assets controlled by foreign banks in Asia is still lower than 
that of other emerging economies, despite great increases in the post-crisis period.  The author 
reviews regulations on foreign bank entry that may have limited the presence of foreign banks or 
influenced the method of entry (branching versus subsidiary).   
Given recent regulatory changes and the need for bank recapitalization in the region, the 
presence of foreign banks is expected to increase in the near future, so this study next takes up the 
policy implications of this trend.  To date, foreign banks in most Asian countries appear to perform 
relatively worse than their domestic counterparts as measured by return on equity, cost to income 
ratios, and the ratio of problem loans to total loans.  This finding contradicts previous research in 
other emerging economies, and may be due to the fact that foreign bank entry in Asia is still a very 
recent phenomenon, and has occurred mostly through the takeover of troubled banks in the region. 
The second policy issue examined here is the stability of lending by foreign banks 
relative to domestic banks.  Macroeconomic data suggests that foreign bank lending may in some 
cases be more stable than domestic bank lending, particularly during crisis, but that the stability of 
foreign bank lending varies greatly by method of entry.  Cross border claims of foreign banks are the 
most volatile, followed by foreign bank branch lending.  Lending by foreign bank subsidiaries 
capitalized in the host country appear to be more stable than domestic lending, perhaps providing 
much needed capital during times of crisis.   
Therefore, foreign banks play an important role in Asia, not only in the traditional ways 
by providing new services and stimulating competition and efficiency, but also by contributing to 
stability of the banking sector in the face of macroeconomic fluctuations.   However, the mode of 
foreign entry seems to have important implications for the contributions of foreign banks.  Since 
lending by off-shore banks and foreign bank branches seems to be more volatile than locally 
capitalized foreign subsidiaries, policy makers in Asia should encourage foreign players to enter via 
fully-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures and move away from the previous pattern of branch-based 
entry.   
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The Role of Foreign Banks in Post-Crisis Asia:   
The Importance of Method of Entry 
Heather Montgomery 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although the Asian Crisis has brought consensus on the necessity of strong domestic 
financial systems, there is less consensus on the role of foreign banks in achieving the 
goals of economic growth and stabilization.  Foreign banks are one obvious source for 
the capital so badly needed in the region, and proponents of their entry argue that 
foreign participation is a vital part of creating a vibrant financial system with a wide 
range of financial services and industries (Liu (2002b)).  But policy makers in the 
region worry about the potential negative effects of opening up their financial markets 
to foreign participation. Recent research showing a pattern in which financial crises tend 
to be preceded by financial liberalization has increased concern about the effects of 
opening up the banking system.  In particular, there are concerns that foreign bank entry 
will expedite “de facto KAO (capital account opening)” (Liu (2002a)), perhaps 
contributing to the instability of financial markets and the banking sector.   
This study on the role of foreign banks in post-crisis Asia begins, in section 2, 
by providing some quantitative estimates of how far foreign banks have penetrated the 
banking sector in Asia and other emerging markets.  Previous studies have 
underestimated the presence of foreign banks in Asia due to their failure to account for 
entry via branching, the mode of entry most common in Asian countries.  Section 3 
discusses this point, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of entry via branching 
versus merger and acquisition.  However, even after accounting for entry via branching, 
the level of participation of foreign institutions in Asia is still much lower than that in 
other emerging market economies in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.  
Section 4 discusses the regulations on foreign entry in Asian countries, which have 
contributed to this state of affairs, and how these regulations have changed in the 
aftermath of the Asian Crisis. As a result of these regulatory changes, the participation 
of foreign banks in Asia is expected to increase in coming years.  Section 5 discusses 
the expected effects of increased foreign participation on domestic institutions in Asia 
and on the banking sector as a whole.  It reviews the theoretical arguments for and 
against foreign bank participation in emerging markets and surveys the empirical 
evidence available on the issues of efficiency, competition and stability.  Finally, 
section 6 concludes. 
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2.  Penetration of Foreign Banks in Asia 
Table 1. Penetration of Foreign Banks in Emerging Economies 
 
Total Assets  
(in billions USD) 
1994 
Assets Under 
Foreign Control: 
(%) 1994 
Total Assets  
(in billions USD) 
1999 
Assets Under 
Foreign Control: 
(%) 1999 
Central Europe  
Czech Republic 46.6 5.8% 63.4 49.3% 
Hungary 26.8 19.8% 32.6 56.6% 
Poland 39.4 2.1% 91.1 52.8% 
Total 112.8 7.8% 187.1 52.3% 
Latin America  
Argentina 73.2 17.9% 157 48.6% 
Brazil 487 8.4% 732.3 16.8% 
Chile 41.4 16.3% 112.3 53.6% 
Colombia 28.3 6.2% 45.3 17.8% 
Mexico 210.2 1.0% 204.5 18.8% 
Peru 12.3 6.7% 26.3 33.4% 
Venezuela 16.3 0.3% 24.7 41.9% 
Total 868.6 7.5% 1302.4 25.0% 
Total excluding 
Brazil and 
Mexico 
171.4 13.1% 365.6 44.8% 
Asia  
Indonesia n.a. n.a. 43.6 6.7% 
Korea 638 0.8% 642.4 4.3% 
Malaysia 149.7 6.8% 220.6 11.5% 
Thailand 192.8 0.5% 198.8 5.6% 
Total 1091 2.8% 2004.2 6.3% 
* In billions of U.S. dollars. As of December 
 
 
The presence of foreign banks in emerging markets has increased dramatically 
in the 1990s, but this increase has not been as rapid in Asia as it has in the emerging 
markets of Central and Eastern Europe or Latin America.  Figure 1, from Mathieson and 
Roldos (2001), shows the percent of assets under foreign control1 in several emerging 
                                                 
1 Mathieson and Roldos (2001) use three different measures of foreign bank participation in emerging 
markets:  “Foreign Participation” is measured as the ratio of the sum across all banks of the assets of each 
bank multiplied by the percentage of equity held by foreigners to total bank assets.  However, since 
corporate control may not be directly and exclusively related to the proportion of a bank’s equity held by 
a particular owner, “Foreign Control” measures the ratio of the sum of the total assets of those banks 
where foreigners own more than either 40 or 50 percent (Although holding more than 50% of total equity 
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markets.  By this measure, participation in Asia is well below that of emerging markets 
in Central Europe and Latin America.   
Central Europe displays the largest growth in foreign participation, with the 
share of foreign control increasing from less than 10 percent to over 50 percent between 
1994 and 1999. Foreign participation in the banking sector there was prompted by the 
privatization of the previously state-owned banking system.  Hungary was the first to 
embark on an aggressive privatization plan, and by the end of 1999 foreign participation 
in the banking sector reached about 60% of total assets.  Poland’s privatization drive has 
accelerated in the past two years and the share of foreign control of bank assets is now 
above 50%.  The Czech Republic began to privatize its state-owned banks in 1998, and 
by the end of 1999 foreign institutions controlled almost 50% of total bank assets. That 
percentage is expected to reach more than 90% with the privatization of the last 
remaining large state-owned bank in 2001 (Mathieson and Roldos (2001)). 
Likewise, in Latin America, where foreign banks have had a presence for 
decades, foreign control of total bank assets increased from under 10% in 1994 to over a 
quarter of the banking sectors total assets in 1999.  The presence of foreign banks is 
especially strong in Argentina, Chile and Mexico.  They already had a substantial 
participation rate in Argentina and Chile in 1994, and by 1999, the percentage of bank 
assets under their control had increased to roughly half.  The increase in foreign control 
in Mexico, from less than 1% in 1994 to 19% in 1999 is even more striking.  The sale of 
the third largest Mexican bank in May 2000 and the second largest one in June 2000 
will bring foreign control to about 40% (Mathieson and Roldos (2001)).  According to 
them, Brazil is the only market in Latin America where foreign banks are unlikely to 
dominate, due to the large share of bank assets under government control and the 
presence of three well-capitalized, well-managed private banks.   
Among the emerging economies, Asia stands out in terms of the lack of a 
foreign presence in its banking sector.  Although foreign participation in the sector has 
increased dramatically since the Asian crisis of 1997, according to Mathieson and 
Roldos (2001), the percentage of assets under majority foreign control in Asia still 
remained only 6% in 1999.   
3. Method of Entry 
Most studies of foreign participation in the banking sector in Asia underestimate the 
presence of foreign banks, since they focus on the percentage of assets controlled by 
fully-owned, locally-capitalized foreign bank subsidiaries or joint ventures in which a 
foreign partner owns a majority share, and ignore the more significant presence of 
foreign banks via branching.  Until very recently, foreign commercial bank operations 
in Asia were conducted almost entirely through branches or representative offices rather 
than wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures2 (Pigott (1986)).   
                                                                                                                                               
typically ensures effective control of a bank, according to Mathieson and Roldos (2001), a number of 
analysts have argued that hostile takeovers are unlikely to occur when the existing owners hold more than 
40% of bank equity).  The data reported in figure 1 correspond to the 50% foreign control measure.   
Total Assets are measured in billions of US dollars. 
2 This generalization does not apply to all Asian countries.  In Malaysia, for example, almost all foreign 
bank participation occurs through majority foreign-owned joint ventures or fully foreign-owned 
subsidiaries.  
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This tendency to enter via branching is largely the result of regulatory policies 
in Asia as discussed below, but it may also be a strategic choice by the foreign banks.  
For example, ABN-Amro, Commerzbank, HSBC and Banco Santander, which has a 
heavy presence in Latin America, have tended to enter foreign markets by purchasing a 
minority or majority interest in an existing domestic franchise.  On the other hand, 
Citibank, Chase-JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank have tended to enter via branching or 
fully-owned subsidiaries, giving them more control over the newly established bank and 
the opportunity to grow “organically” in the new market (Pomerleano and Vojta 
(2001)).   
Parkhe and Miller (1998) define overseas subsidiaries and overseas branches of 
foreign banks as follows. Overseas subsidiaries of foreign banks are legal entities 
separate from their “parent” bank and are subject to the laws and regulations of the host 
country.  They also may provide the means to isolate the parent and other branches from 
host country laws.  Lending must be based on the subsidiaries’ own capital, so 
subsidiaries almost always require higher capitalization than branches of the same size.  
The offices resemble host country banks and typically adopt a local character with local 
management to obtain access to the local business market.  
Overseas branches, on the other hand, are “integral parts of foreign parent bank 
organizations” (according to the U.S. Department of Commerce3).  Thus, branches are 
subject to taxes and laws of the home country, and their financial policies are mandated 
by the parent bank.  Lending limits for overseas branches are based upon the worldwide 
capital of the parent bank.  Branches can perform traditional banking functions such as 
accepting deposits and issuing loans, but “foreign bank branch activities tend to be 
largely wholesale4 in nature trade with financing and lending to relatively large 
corporations and government agencies generally accounting for the major share of 
assets” (Pigott (1986)). 
The advantages of branching over having a fully foreign owned subsidiary 
include securing the full credit backing of the parent bank, attracting clients through the 
parent’s reputation and access to the managerial and technical support of the parent 
bank.  Subsidiaries tend to be the preferred form of entry for international banks, since 
unlike branches, they can provide a broad array of financial services (Parkhe and Miller 
(1998)).  From the perspective of the host country, branches of foreign banks have their 
own lender of last resort, the foreign head office or home country monetary authority. 
This effectively reduces the burden on the host country in supplying liquidity.  Fully-
owned subsidiaries may provide some of the same advantages.  For example, although 
local subsidiaries of international banks are technically locally capitalized and therefore 
independent, it is argued that reputational effects will prevent the parent from allowing 
the subsidiary to fail.   
                                                 
3 In the United States, 80% of the total assets of foreign owned banks in 1990 were accounted for by 
overseas branches (Hasegawa 1993). 
4 It is difficult to classify banks as engaging in the “retail” or “wholesale” business, since most banks 
conduct a combination of both.  But in general, overseas subsidiaries tend to have more retail business 
while branches of foreign banks tend to stay in wholesale banking. 
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Table 2. Penetration of Foreign Banks in AsiaIncluding Entry Via Branching 
 Assets Under Foreign Control (%) 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Indonesia n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.48% 
Korea 5.80% 5.99% 6.13% 7.25% 
Malaysia n.a. 22.25% 22.21% 24.18% 
Thailand n.a. 3.62% 9.41% 11.33% 
 
 
Using data including foreign bank branching, we find that foreign banks hold a 
significantly larger share of total assets in Asia than indicated by previous studies.  As 
shown in Table 2, the penetration of foreign banks in Asian countries varies 
significantly by country, but is significantly higher than the 6% indicated in Table 1, 
which only included fully foreign-owned subsidiaries.  For example, in Korea, where 
almost no bank assets are under foreign control (with more than 50% foreign 
ownership), foreign banks including branches accounted for over 7% of total banking 
sector assets in 2000.  In Indonesia, Malaysia5 and Thailand as well, the inclusion of 
data on foreign bank branches more than doubles the reported percentage of assets 
under foreign control. 
However, even after accounting for the significant amount of foreign bank 
participation occurring through branching, it is clear that the penetration of foreign 
banks in Asia is still much lower than in Central Europe or Latin America.  Even in 
Malaysia, where foreign banks hold more than 24% of total banking sector assets, the 
percentage is lower than in Central Europe or in Latin America.  Overall, the 
participation rate of foreign banks in Asia is currently below the level of Central Europe 
or in Latin America even in the early 1990s. 
4.   Regulations on Foreign Bank Entry in Asia 
The low participation rate of foreign banks in Asia is largely a legacy of strict regulation 
on foreign bank entry and operation by governments in Asia.  Until fairly recently, most 
Asian countries had formal restrictions on the entry of foreign bank branches, in most 
cases explicit bans.  Even in countries where the new entry of foreign banks was legally 
permitted, it was prevented in practice (Pigott (1986)).  The same is true of entry via 
minority interest or joint venture banks.  For example, even before the 1997 crisis,  
foreign bank subsidiaries in Korea were “permitted in principle but prevented in 
practice by host authorities’ unwillingness to expand the number of domestically 
chartered banks”.  The exception was KORAM bank, a joint venture of Bank of 
America and local Korean banks. It has now been joined by Korea First Bank, which is 
majority owned by the foreign Newbridge Capital.   
Formal and informal restrictions on not only entry, but also operations, of 
foreign banks were also common.  With the exception of Malaysia, until very recently 
                                                 
5 In Malaysia, where all foreign bank participation takes the form of fully owned foreign subsidiaries, the 
increase in foreign participation rates in Table 2 is accounted for by the fact that banks not listed on the 
local stock market are also included in the data set. 
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no country in Asia afforded foreign banks “national treatment”, meaning the same 
powers and restrictions as domestic banks (Pigott (1986)).  In almost all countries 
government deposits were limited to domestic banks and foreign banks were denied 
access to the central bank discount window and subsidized trade credit facilities.  In 
Korea, although foreign banks could “by and large participate in essentially the same 
range of commercial lending activities, and on essentially the same terms, as their local 
competitors”, in practice they were generally limited to one or two branch offices6, 
nearly always in the main financial centers.  This seriously limited their ability to gather 
local currency deposits from other regions.  In addition, regulations governing foreign 
branch capital effectively limited the funds they could obtain on the interbank market, 
as well as the total amount of deposits they could accept.  In Indonesia, they were 
prohibited from taking time deposits and were geographically restricted in their lending 
activity as well, to the Jakarta region.   
However, in other areas, particularly those involving foreign currency 
transactions, foreign banks had advantages over their domestic competitors.  For 
example, in Korea, “foreign banks were permitted to ‘swap’ foreign exchange for 
lending in won at a guaranteed margin, a privilege not granted to domestic banks”.  
Even when overt discriminatory policies were not in place, domestic banks were 
sometime to subject to government credit allocation programs not imposed on foreign 
banks.  For example, state-owned or controlled banks in Indonesia and Korea have been 
subject to requirements that they allocate a certain portion of credit to key sectors, often 
at preferential rates.   
4.1. Indonesia 
Foreign banks were effectively expelled from Indonesia by the Sukarno regime in the 
1950s, only to be brought back in 1968 as the Suharto government sought to revive the 
country’s banking system.  However, after an initial influx of eleven foreign banks that 
year, a ban on new entry was imposed in 1969 (Pigott (1986)), (Nasution (1983)).   
However, several joint venture banks were established following the 1988 PAKTO 
reforms, which opened up the banking sector to new entrants.  Under these reforms, 
foreign banks were allowed to set up joint ventures with domestic banking partners, but 
they were restricted to 2 offices in each of 6 cities.  Although there are no longer any 
restrictions on the number of branches permitted to foreign banks, they are still required 
to have half of their loan assets available for export-related lending.   
Before the Asian crisis, it was considered unlikely that more foreign banking 
licenses would be granted, but that may have changed (Asian Capital Markets Online 
Handbook).  One very evident result of the crisis is that the percentage of foreign 
ownership in joint ventures is now very high.  With the collapse of the banking sector 
and the overall economy in 1997, joint venture banks suffered massive losses.  In many 
cases, the domestic partner was unable to participate in the recapitalization of the bank.  
In response, the government raised the limit on the foreign ownership of joint-venture 
banks from 85% to 99% and now the percentage of foreign ownership in Indonesia’s 
                                                 
6 Domestic banks were generally also limited in the number of branches they could have, but since they 
usually pre-dated the foreign banks, they usually had substantial nationwide branch networks. 
 7
“joint banks” is very high.  There are also many foreign banks operating in Indonesia as 
branches of their parent bank. 
4.2. Korea 
Foreign banks in Korea faced several restrictions on their operations, as well as some 
special discriminatory treatment, but these were lifted in the early 1990s as Korea 
moved toward the “national treatment” of foreign banks.  Restrictions on the number of 
branches they were allowed to operate were abolished in the mid-1980s (Park (1996)) 
and foreign ownership through joint ventures or fully-owned subsidiaries was 
completely liberalized after the 1997 crisis (Cho (2002)). Although the majority stock 
purchase in Korea First Bank by Newbridge Capital in December 1999 significantly 
raised the amount of bank assets under foreign control in Korea, almost all foreign entry 
into the banking sector there is still through foreign bank branches rather than joint 
ventures.   
4.3. Malaysia 
Compared to other Asian countries, Malaysia has a relatively large presence of foreign 
banks.  But authorities in Malaysia at first exhibited caution in opening up the sector.  
Originally, foreign banks could only make loans in partnership with domestic banks, 
and the foreign ownership of joint venture banks was limited to 30%.  After 1983, 
roughly one decade passed in which no new foreign banks were established.  However, 
between 1995 and 1996, several 100% foreign owned banks were established.  Now, 
many foreign banks are operating in Malaysia, and their role in Malaysia’s banking 
sector is similar to that of Indonesia, where there are many locally capitalized foreign 
banks.  Of the 27 commercial banks, half are locally incorporated, fully foreign-owned 
subsidiaries and one is a joint venture with a foreign bank holding a substantial minority 
share.  Most of these foreign subsidiaries have been operating since 1994 because under 
the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1989, all foreign banks were required to 
be incorporated locally by the end of September 1994.   
4.4.  Thailand 
Foreign bank branches were established early in Thailand; in fact commercial banking 
began in 1888 with a foreign bank branch.  At first, foreign bank branches were the 
most active banks, but government restrictions restricted their growth.  “Before the 
financial crisis emergedno new banking license had been issued for more than twenty 
years.  Furthermore, almost all foreign banks were allowed to operate only one 
branch in Bangkok” (Santiprabhob (2002)).  Locally incorporated banks were required 
by law to be majority owned by Thai citizens, so there was no foreign entry via joint 
ventures or foreign-owned subsidiaries.   
This changed with the financial crisis of 1997.  It left banks in need of large 
amounts of new capital which could not be raised in local markets. In response, the 
government relaxed foreign ownership restrictions, allowing foreign interests to hold a 
majority stake in Thai financial institutions for up to ten years.  As a result, at the end of 
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2001 there were four majority foreign-owned joint venture banks operating there7.  
There have also been several new foreign entrants into the banking sector via branching 
in the post-crisis period, but there are no 100% foreign-owned subsidiaries of foreign 
banks listed on the Thai Stock Exchange. 
5.  Effects of Foreign Bank Entry 
As documented in Section 4, the presence of foreign financial institutions in Asia is 
likely to increase rapidly in the coming years due to regulatory changes enacted in the 
wake of the crisis of 1997.  Given the trends observed in the rest of the developing 
world, it is expected that the role of foreign banks will increase in the near future. This 
topic has been a focus of debate by policymakers in these countries as well as 
academics studying the issue.  
In support of increased participation, many point out that foreign banks can 
play an important role in facilitating capital inflows, thus enhancing the host country’s 
access to international capital.  Their presence may improve the financial infrastructure, 
including accounting and transparency, by stimulating the establishment and 
strengthening of rating agencies, auditors, credit bureaus and the development of the 
host country’s supervisory and legal framework.  In addition, they effectively “import” 
financial system supervision and supervisory skills from home country regulators, 
which may spill over to the host country (Levine (1996), Liu (2002a), Liu (2002b)). 
There are also arguments against foreign bank participation.  Policymakers 
worry about competition from them.  Foreign banks may be able to “cherry pick” the 
“best” customers, leaving domestic banks to serve the remaining high risk customers.  
Proponents of entry defend their position by arguing that competition will spur domestic 
banks to improve quality and cut costs, thus promoting financial development.  Others 
claim that fears that foreign banks will dominate the entire market are unsubstantiated, 
since they enter countries by targeting specific market niches.   
In the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997, there are also concerns that foreign 
banks have a destabilizing effect because they provide additional avenues for capital 
flight and may rapidly withdraw in the face of a crisis8 (Park (2002)).  However, 
proponents of their entry point out that since domestic branches of foreign banks are 
likely to possess a more internationally diversified asset base, they may be less 
vulnerable to domestic business cycles, and thus may provide a more stable source of 
credit than domestic banks.   
                                                 
7 However, as noted by Suehiro (2002), we should not over-emphasize the presence of foreign banks in 
Thailand since “the top five local commercial banks have never changed their ultimate owners even after 
the crisis, and they still control 75% of total assets and deposits among the thirteen existing local 
commercial banks”.  
8 In their study of Argentina, Canada and Mexico, Gruben and Moore (1999) find that the link between 
financial liberalization or privatization and risky behavior on the part of banks depends upon the degree 
of market discipline.  In their study, in countries without market discipline, lending risk increased 
significantly in the wake of financial liberalization, but in countries where depositors disciplined banks, 
banks did not behave riskily and risk did not increase in the wake of privatization.  Peria and Serio (2001) 
find evidence of the existence of market discipline in Argentina, Chile and Mexico during the 1980s and 
1990s: depositors punished risky banks by withdrawing their deposits.  The authors conclude that “across 
countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market discipline exists even among small, insured 
depositors.” 
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This section examines each of these last two arguments in turn: the amount of 
competition from foreign entrants and the effects of this competition on the efficiency 
of the host country’s banking sector as a whole; and the effects of foreign entry on the 
stability of the host country’s banking system. 
5.1. Competition and Efficiency 
There are several issues related to competition and efficiency that need to be considered 
by policymakers.  First, are foreign banks more or less efficient than domestic banks 
operating in the host country?  If, as many proponents of entry suppose, they are more 
efficient than domestic banks, then what effect will their entry have on domestic banks 
already operating in the host country?  Will the competition spur efficiency gains 
among domestic banks as well, promoting financial development in the host country?  
Or will the foreign banks simply outcompete the domestic banks, taking over the entire 
banking sector? 
Many early studies on foreign bank entry, which focused on industrialized 
countries, found that foreign banks there tended to be less efficient than domestic banks 
(Chang, Hasan and Hunter (1998), DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Hasan and Hunter 
(1996), Mahajan, Rangan and Zardkoohi (1996), Peek, Rosengren and Kasirye (1998)).  
A cross-country study investigating the efficiency of foreign banks in the mature 
markets of France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
confirmed this view, with the finding that foreign entrants are less efficient in terms of 
profits and costs than domestic banks (Berger et. al. (2000)).  In the case of foreign 
entry via the takeover of an existing bank, it is possible that the poor performance is due 
to problems that were already present at the time of acquisition.  But research has shown 
that even after changes in business strategy by the new foreign owners, the performance 
of the banks did not improve (Peek, Rosengren and Kasirye (1998)). 
By contrast, studies on the effects of foreign bank entry in developing countries 
report the opposite findings.  There, foreign banks appear to be more efficient than 
domestic banks (Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1999), Clarke et. al. (1999), Clarke et. al. 
(2001), Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1998), Denizer (1999), Honohan (2000), 
Kiraly et. al. (2000)).  Even in the case of entry via the takeover of an existing domestic 
bank, research shows that in emerging markets in Latin America, the financial strength 
ratings of local banks acquired by foreign entities generally improve relative to their 
domestic counterparts (Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2001)).  Not only do foreign 
banks in emerging markets tend to be more efficient than domestic banks, but 
significant entry is associated with increases in the efficiency of domestic banks as well.  
These efficiency effects were shown to occur immediately after entry and did not 
depend upon the foreign banks gaining a substantial market share (Claessens and 
Glaessner (1999), Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1998)). 
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Table 3. Performance of Foreign and Domestic Banks in Emerging Economies 
  
Return on Equity Cost-to-Income ratio Problem loans/ total loans 
(units: %) Foreign Banks 
Domestic 
Banks Foreign Banks
Domestic 
Banks Foreign Banks 
Domestic 
Banks 
Central 
Europe  
Czech 
Republic 14.4 −1.6 70.9 40.5 18.8 28.5 
Hungary 16.1 −26 62.4 113 10.6 15.1 
Poland 24.1 −0.1 50.9 59.9 11.1 9.2 
Total 19.3 −5 59.9 62.1 13.7 17.1 
        
Turkey 68.3 29.8 39 48.2 6.1 4.1 
        
Latin 
America  
Argentina 5.8 −0.7 73.4 76.9 5.7 17.3 
Brazil 10.4 5.2 73.3 68.8 7.5 7.6 
Chile 10.9 14.9 59.8 64.4 1.9 1.5 
Colombia 2.7 1.7 70.6 69.1 5.4 6.8 
Mexico −14.3 −2.1 112.3 78.5 4.1 8.7 
Peru 14.9 10.8 64.8 80.5 6 13.2 
Venezuela 40.6 38.2 56.3 64.6 3.9 4.1 
Total 6.3 4.7 77.9 71.2 6.1 8.5 
Total 
excluding 
Brazil and 
Mexico 
9.9 7.5 67.5 71.9 4.5 10.4 
        
Asia  
Korea −44.2 −20 53.7 69.2 15.1 8.6 
Malaysia 16.4 7.8 34.7 42.6 6.8 8.4 
Thailand −66.1 −20.2 128.9 72 46.2 36.5 
Total −35.7 −14.3 63.8 64.2 19.2 13.8 
 
 
In Asian economies, because the entry of foreign banks is still a relatively new 
phenomenon, there are only limited empirical studies of the relative performance of 
foreign and domestic banks.  Table 3 from Mathieson and Roldos (2001) shows that in 
the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, foreign 
banks generally report higher returns on equity and lower cost-to-income and problem 
loan ratios than do domestic banks.  However, in some Asian countries, the performance 
indicators of locally-capitalized foreign banks are worse than those of domestically-
owned banks.  This may be due to the fact that it was only recently that many foreign 
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banks entered Asia via mergers and acquisitions.  These few takeovers and mergers 
were often allowed only in order to provide much needed capital to troubled banks in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis.  In time, these newly acquired banks may regain their 
asset quality and performance.  Note that in Malaysia, where foreign owned subsidiaries 
pre-date the Asian crisis of 1997, foreign banks outperform domestic banks on 
aggregate.  
Studies which look at measures of openness to foreign entry rather than actual 
entry by foreign banks suggest that the limited openness of Asian economies to date has 
been costly.  Cross-country studies find that tighter restrictions on entry into the 
banking sector tend to increase overhead costs and reduce the efficiency of the banking 
sector (Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)).  A related study of eight Asian economies in 
particular reveals that “the costs of financial services and the fragility of the financial 
systems are negatively related to the degree of openness of the domestic market to 
foreign financial firms” (Claessens and Glaessner (1999)). 
Even if foreign banks prove to be more efficient than domestic banks in Asia, 
as they have been in other emerging markets, fears that they will take over the entire 
banking sector and completely dominate domestic banks are probably unrealistic, since 
they enter countries by targeting specific market niches (Levine (1996)).  A study of the 
effect of foreign bank entry on domestic banks in Argentina shows that they tend to 
enter specific areas where they have a comparative advantage.  Although domestic 
banks with a concentration in areas that were aggressively targeted by foreign banks 
experienced falling net margins and increasing overheads, domestic banks specializing 
in other markets showed higher net margins and higher before tax profits (Clarke et. al. 
(1999)).  Thus, even if Asia opens to foreign bank entry, domestic banks will be able to 
retain competitive advantages that come from “superior knowledge of local 
circumstances and relationships within the local community” (Meltzer (1998)).   
The degree of competition felt by domestic banks upon foreign entry depends 
to some extent upon the reason for the entry into the host market.  Many studies 
examing the determinants of foreign bank activity find that the expansion is determined 
by foreign direct investment in other sectors of the economy, suggesting a “follow the 
customer” strategy9 (Aliber (1984), Buch and Lapp (1998), Buch (2000), Goldberg and 
Saunders (1981), Goldberg and Johnson (1990), Gross and Goldberg (1991), Miller and 
Parkhe (1998), Sabi (1988), Sagari (1992)).  However, most of these studies focus on 
U.S. banks, and the motivation behind their entry into foreign markets, varies by region.  
In Latin America, the first wave of foreign bank entry came as a result of regulatory 
liberalization, and accelerated in the wake of the Tequila Crisis.  In Central and Eastern 
Europe, foreign bank entry came after government-owned banks were privatized.  In 
Asia, it seems to follow foreign direct investment in other sectors.   
                                                 
9 Clarke et al. (2001) point out that in most studies it is unclear whether FDI in the non-financial sector is 
the causal influence on the FDI of banks.  Causation may run the other way, or some omitted factor may 
explain both.  Although most studies attempt to control for omitted factors such as market size (proxied 
for by GDP or population) or foreign trade, these controls may not be sufficient.  Even if a convincing 
link is found between non-financial FDI and FDI by banks, this positive association does not necessarily 
mean that foreign banks are providing services exclusively or even primarily to the affiliates of clients 
from their home countries. 
 12
Research into the expansion of Japanese banks, which may have the strongest 
presence in Asia, indicates that although they often may enter foreign markets on the 
heels of foreign direct investment by clients in the manufacturing sector, they eventually 
begin to serve local clients as wellissuing trade credits for related suppliers for 
example.  Pomerleano and Vojta (2001) find that in the Philippines, Japanese banks 
tend to focus on servicing large Japanese corporations seeking to finance their foreign 
direct investment rather than multinational corporations or local customers. Thus they 
have little effect on the domestic banks in the Philippines.  Other studies (Seth and 
Quijano (1991), Nolle and Seth (1996)) have found that Japanese banks initially enter in 
pursuit of their customers abroad, but there is evidence that they then expand their 
customer base to include domestic companies.  For example, Yamori (1998) 
investigates the locational choice of Japanese banks and finds that FDI, particularly 
from the manufacturing industry, is an important determinant of the location choice of 
Japanese financial institutions, suggesting that Japanese banks follow their customers-
the Japanese manufacturing industry.  However, unlike U.S. banks expansion patterns 
abroad, the expansion patterns of Japanese banks seem to also be affected by the size of 
local banking opportunities in the host countries as measured by the log of per capita 
GNP in the host country.  Looking at the expansion of Japanese banks into the United 
States, Peek and Rosengren (1998) find that their customer base in the 1980s included 
“numerous domestic U.S. companies.”  
Of course, foreign bank activity is determined not just by nationality, but also 
by the particular strategy of the bank in question.  Deutsche Bank and other money 
center banks such as Chase-JP Morgan, have withdrawn somewhat from emerging 
markets, limiting their credit exposure in order to focus on investment banking and 
private banking activities.  These banks may offer some trade finance, but mostly 
provide advanced treasury and capital market products, cross-border underwriting and 
M&A services-niche markets that offer little direct competition for domestic markets.  
Following a completely different strategy, at least three foreign banks operating in 
emerging economies-local subsidiaries of Citibank, HSBC and Standard Chartered-have 
done well in the retail banking10 market by targeting high-end consumer and commercial 
business and offering innovative and high-quality retail services, credit cards, and 
mortgage and personal lending.  There is also some evidence that in the mid-1990s, 
Japanese banks shifted their emphasis in Asia away from wholesale toward retail 
banking (McCauley and Yeaple (1994)).  
Overall, research to date suggests that greater openness to foreign financial 
institutions will benefit emerging markets in Asia.  Although the activities of some 
foreign entrants may provide competition for domestic banks, this will spur efficiency 
in the banking sector for both foreign and domestic players.  Moreover, the role of 
domestic financial institutions will not be eliminated by the entry of foreign banks.  By 
capitalizing on their local knowledge and relationships in the retail and small and 
medium enterprise loan markets, domestic banks will continue to play a crucial role in 
the financial system.  Very few foreign banks are likely to penetrate these markets to a 
meaningful degree.  Rather, foreign banks are likely to focus on areas where they have 
demonstrated a comparative advantage: foreign exchange and derivatives trading, global 
underwriting of bonds and equities, cross-border M&As, trade finance and investment 
                                                 
10 As noted above, it is difficult to categorize banks as solely “wholesale” or solely “retail” banks. 
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management services.  Thus, rather than substituting for domestic bank services, they 
will complement the range of wholesale and retail products offered by domestic banks.   
5.2. Stability 
Because of the enormous economic damage caused by the Asian crisis of 1997, the 
main concern of policymakers in Asia is often not the efficiency of or even competition 
from foreign banks, but stability.  Foreign banks tend to be more specialized in foreign 
currency lending (Pigott (1986)), and as shown in Table 4 below, hold a higher 
percentage of both assets and liabilities in foreign currency.  Note that the spread 
between the percentage of foreign liabilities and foreign assets is much higher for 
foreign banks than for domestic ones, indicating that foreign banks have higher net 
external positions.   
 
Table 4. Foreign Assets and Liabilities of Foreign and Domestic Banks in Asia 
 Domestic Banks Foreign Banks 
 Foreign Assets Foreign Liabilities* Foreign Assets Foreign Liabilities* 
Indonesia 5.42% 5.11% (18.10%) 8.26% 43.01% (69.05%) 
Korea 7.76% 7.17% (13.17%) 9.33% 65.1% (65.29%) 
Malaysia 2.91% 4.09% 1.43% 11.63% 
* Foreign liabilities including foreign currency deposits are in parentheses.       
 
 
These issues have brought concerns that foreign banks may withdraw more 
rapidly than domestic banks in the event of crisis (Park (2002)), or even that the very 
presence of foreign banks may increase the likelihood of a crisis.  However, because 
foreign banks can rely upon an internationally-diversified funding base-in particular 
advances from the parent (Terrell (1979), (1986))-proponents of foreign bank access 
point out that they are likely to be less vulnerable to business cycles in the host country, 
and thus may provide a more stable source of credit than domestic banks.  By 
diversifying the host country’s overall banking system, international banks may actually 
stabilize it (Meltzer (1998)), making it less vulnerable to crisis.   
Empirical evidence suggests that foreign banks remain sensitive to economic 
conditions in their home countries. Lending by Japanese banks operating branches in 
the United States has been shown to be sensitive to the financial condition of the parent 
bank (Peek and Rosengren (1997), (2000a)), and U.S. bank claims on Latin American 
and Asian emerging markets and industrialized countries have been shown to be 
sensitive to U.S. macroeconomic conditions (Goldberg and Kinney (2001)).  However, 
the operations of foreign banks appear to be insensitive to macroeconomic conditions in 
the host country, at least for emerging markets (Goldberg and Kinney (2001)).  This 
suggests that foreign banks can play an important role in providing credit during 
economic downturns.  As long as the business cycle of the host country and the home 
country are not perfectly synchronized, this situation can actually be a stabilizing force.  
Indeed, it has been shown empirically that foreign bank penetration rose in the wake of 
crisis in Latin America (Peek and Rosengrean (2002b)), and we are currently seeing the 
same trend in post-crisis Asia.  Thus, foreign banks seem to play an important role in 
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supplying credit when domestic institutions are unable to do so and in recapitalizing the 
banking sector in crisis-hit economies.   
There is also the question of whether the lending of existing foreign banks is 
more volatile than that of domestic banks, and whether existing foreign banks are more 
likely than domestic banks to withdraw in the face of crisis.   
Overall, there seems to be little evidence to support this.  On the contrary, 
studies on the behavior of foreign banks in Latin America during the Tequila crisis of 
1994-1995 provide evidence that foreign banks may actually increase stability in crisis 
hit countries (Goldberg and Kinney (2000), Crystal and Goldberg (2001), Peek and 
Rosengren (2000b)).  Goldberg and Kinney (2000) investigate the behavior of foreign 
and domestic banks in Argentina and Mexico for the period 1994-1999 and fail to find 
any support for the argument that foreign banks contribute to instability or are 
excessively volatile in their responses to market signals.  In fact, the authors find that 
foreign banks exhibited stronger loan growth and lower volatility of lending in the 
period surrounding the 1994-1995 Tequila crisis.  Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2001) 
report similar results in their study of foreign bank activity in Chile, Columbia and 
Argentina: foreign banks showed higher and more stable average loan growth, higher 
average provisioning expense, comparable or weaker profitability, and higher risk-based 
capital ratios than domestic banks.  These data echo the findings of Peek and Rosengren 
(2000b) for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.  They found that despite economic problems 
in the host countries, foreign bank subsidiaries there have continued to grow.  Contrary 
to the concerns of policymakers in developing countries, “foreign bank subsidiaries did 
not pull back in response to economic problems in the host country; rather, they viewed 
the economic problems as providing opportunities to expand, either by acquisition or by 
internal growth of existing subsidiaries.”  These findings suggest that foreign ownership 
may provide an important stabilizing influence in emerging market financial systems. 
Table 5 presents average loan growth rates11 for domestic banks and foreign 
bank branches and subsidiaries operating in Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia both before 
and after the crisis of 1997.  As in Latin America, there appears to be no statistically 
significant difference between loan growth rates for domestic and foreign financial 
institutions.  Although there has been little rigorous research into the influence of 
foreign banks on Asian emerging markets, there is some evidence that those that were 
already operating in Asia prior to the 1997 crisis contributed to stability in the region.  
In Indonesia, foreign banks were spared the bank runs that forced domestic banks to 
rebuild liquidity and curtail lending.  In addition, exchange rate and interest rate shocks 
to the Indonesian economy had a much more adverse effect on domestic bank capital 
than on foreign bank capital, meaning that the supply of bank loans from foreign banks 
was less affected (Aziz et. al. (2002)).  Although foreign banks could not supply enough 
credit to completely offset the decrease in supply by domestic banks, they clearly played 
a stabilizing influence during the crisis.   
                                                 
11 Due to data limitations, Table 5 does not include cross-border lending by off-shore financial centers, 
which may be more volatile. 
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Table 5. Loan Growth of Domestic and Foreign Banks in Pre- and Post-Crisis Asia 
 
Pre-Crisis 
(-Dec 1996) 
Post-Crisis  
(Jan 2000 - Mar 2002) 
Domestic 28.26 (1.00) 
18.56 
(4.04) Indonesia 
Foreign 22.19 (2.03) 
11.50     
 (5.34) 
Domestic 17.16 (6.52) 
19.40    
 (1.78) Korea 
Foreign 6.52 (1.64) 
13.79     
 (4.97) 
Domestic n.a. 5.23        (0.73) Malaysia 
Foreign n.a. 8.30        (1.39) 
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
However, the stability of foreign bank lending during banking crises may 
depend upon the mode of entry of the institutions.  Recent studies indicate that 
subsidiaries allow foreign banks to provide a wider range of activities and bring greater 
stability in lending to host countries than do branches, although empirical research in 
this area is limited (Clarke and Sanches (2001)).  Table 6 shows the average loan 
growth rates for foreign-owned branches and foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in 
Indonesia and Thailand.  In both countries, foreign bank branches have statistically 
significantly higher loan growth rates than do foreign bank subsidiaries, but this higher 
growth is accompanied by higher volatility in lending as well.   
 
 
Table 6. Average Loan Growth Rates of Foreign Banks in Indonesia 
 and Thailand 
Branches 17.75  (6.45) 
Indonesia 
Subsidiaries 3.04 (4.19) 
Branches 40.06 (17.80) 
Thailand 
Subsidiaries 5.37 (2.64) 
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Even more volatile than the lending of foreign bank branches is that of off-
shore foreign banks.  Although “off-shore financial activities are not inimical to global 
financial stability provided they are well supervised and supervisory authorities co-
operate”12 (BIS (2000)), there is substantial evidence that off-shore lenders actually 
retreat in times of crisis.  During the Tequila crisis in Latin America, off-shore lenders 
pulled back in response to the economic problems in the host country, unlike foreign 
bank subsidiaries, who took the opportunity to expand their operations (Peek and 
Rosengren (2000b)).  During the Asian crisis, while U.S. money center banks generally 
maintained the operations of their offshore branches and subsidiaries, cross border 
lending into Asia plummeted13 (Palmer (2000)).   
It is difficult to empirically document the role of offshore financial centers in 
capital flight, since many of their activities are not included on the balance sheet.  
However, even aggregate data confirms that cross-border lending is more volatile than 
domestic lending or lending by foreign institutions that entered via branching or 
subsidiaries.  Table 7 shows outstanding loans and credit before and after the Asian 
crisis of 1997 for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.  Cross-border claims in all 
these crisis hit economies fell substantially between 1996 and 1998.  In most, 
outstanding loans by domestic banks fell or grew only slightly over the same period.  
Outstanding loans by foreign banks, however, grew significantly.  This suggests that as 
in the case of Latin America during the Tequila crisis of 1994-1995, foreign bank 
subsidiaries and branches stepped in to provide loan demand that could not be met by 
domestic banks during the Asian crisis.  However, cross-border lending was actually 
more volatile than any other types of lending, and exacerbated, if not to some extent 
caused, the credit crunch that accompanied the crisis. These large disparities in the 
lending behavior of foreign banks that are present via subsidiaries or branches, versus 
those that are engaged primarily in cross border lending, has led to recommendations 
that policymakers concerned about the stability of foreign bank lending should 
encourage cross-border lending through brick and mortar subsidiary operations rather 
than through offshore lending (Peek and Rosengren (2000b)). 
 
                                                 
12 BIS (2000) provides a grouping of offshore financial centers into categories reflecting their perceived 
quality of supervision and degree of co-operation.   
13 For example, cross-border lending to Asia fell 36% between June 1997 and June 1999, but local claims 
of foreign banks declined just 6%.   
NB: Cross-border claims are those booked outside the foreign counterparty’s home country, usually at the 
U.S. bank’s head office in the United States.  This type of claim is usually denominated in U.S. dollars.  
Local claims on foreign counterparties are those booked in the local offices of the reporting bank-offices 
located in the country of the counterparty. 
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Table 7. Outstanding Loans in Pre- and Post-Crisis Asia 
 
1996 1998 Rate of Change: 1996-1998 
Cross-Border Claims 
of BIS Banks  
(units: $ bil) 
Total Claims 58.7 45.0 −23.3% 
Foreign 12,412 32,225 159.6% 
Indonesia 
Local Lending 
(units: Rp bil) Domestic 71,153.4 125,110 75.8% 
Cross-Border Claims 
of BIS Banks  
(units: $ bil) 
Total Claims 104.2 67.3 −35.4% 
Foreign 7,361.9 8,364.4 13.6% Korea Local Lending 
(units: Won bil) Domestic 148,726.7 152,958.9 2.9% 
Cross-Border Claims 
of BIS Banks  
(units: $ bil) 
Total Claims 28.8 18.9 −34.4% 
Foreign 47.9 66.1 38.0% 
Malaysia 
Local Lending 
(units: RM bil) Domestic 178.5 246.6 38.2% 
Cross-Border Claims 
of BIS Banks  
(units: $ bil) 
Total Claims 69.4 39.4 −43.2% 
Foreign 143.8 173.4 20.6% 
Thailand 
Local Lending 
(units: Baht bil) Domestic 4,111.2 3,762.9 −8.5% 
* Cross-Border claims of BIS banks includes non-local currency claims by BIS reporting banks’ 
affiliates in vis-à-vis countries. Local foreign banks lending includes lending in non-local currency as 
well as lending in local currency.  The rate of change in foreign banks’ local lending as measured in 
billions of USD was −22.90 % for Indonesia, −20.59 % for Korea, −8.12 % for Malaysia, and for 
−14.95 % for Thailand. 
 
 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that overall, cross-country studies on 
the relationship between foreign bank entry and the incidence of banking crisis suggest 
that the presence of foreign banks, or even just opening to foreign bank entry, reduces 
the likelihood of crises.  Investigating the period 1988-1995, Demirguc-Kunt and Min 
(1998) show that foreign bank entry is associated with a decreased incidence of local 
banking crises.  A study by Levine (1999), building upon the work of Demirguc-Kunt 
and Min (1998), uses the same multivariate logit model to relate the probability of a 
banking crisis to a series of macroeconomic and banking system health indicators, 
including the number of foreign banks relative to total banks.  Levine’s study reports 
that the foreign bank share variable has a statistically significant negative coefficient, 
leading to the conclusion that greater foreign bank participation was a stabilizing 
influence after controlling for other factors.  Barth and Levine (2001) find that it is not 
foreign bank ownership per se that is linked to the likelihood of a banking crisis, but 
rather limitations on foreign-bank entry and ownership.  Independent of actual foreign 
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bank entry, they find that the likelihood of a major banking crisis is positively 
associated with greater limitations on foreign-bank participation. 
6. Conclusions 
The following conclusions emerge from this overview of the role of foreign banks in 
Asia.   
In post-crisis Asia, foreign banks operate on a much more even playing field 
with domestic banks compared to the past.  Branching restrictions, as well as special 
treatment for the branches of foreign banks, were largely phased out with the financial 
sector liberalization that was implemented in most countries in the 1980s.  More 
recently, ceilings on the shares of foreign partners in joint ventures have been raised 
substantially and in most cases eliminated.   
However, as a legacy of the previously heavily regulated environment, the 
penetration of foreign banks in Asia-whether measured in terms of loans, deposits or 
assets-is very low, lower than in Central Europe or Latin America even in the early 
1990s.  This fact is observed even when taking into account the activity of foreign banks 
via branches, the mode of entry most used by foreign banks in Asia.   
Looking forward, the presence of foreign banks in Asia is expected to increase 
rapidly, due to both the deregulation already in place and the progress being made by 
the World Trade Organization on the Generalized Agreement on Trade in Services. 
Although many developing countries have already unilaterally liberalized trade in 
services and entry into the financial sector, the signing of the GATS will reinforce the 
trend toward financial service liberalization, and lock countries into a commitment to 
maintain the liberalization they have instituted thus far.  Finally, foreign financial 
institutions are increasingly being welcomed in Asian countries as part of the 
recapitalization of the banking sector in the wake of the crisis.  As academic research 
has shown, banking crises bring increased foreign participation in the banking sector.   
This increase in foreign participation in the banking sector should be welcomed 
by policymakers.  The presence of foreign banks will likely improve the financial 
infrastructure, including accounting and transparency, by stimulating the establishment 
and strengthening of rating agencies, auditors, credit bureaus. Foreign banks effectively 
“import” financial system supervision and supervisory skills from home country 
regulators, and these skills may spill over to the host country.   
In addition, foreign banks can help improve financial services within a country 
both by offering services directly and through increased competition with domestic 
banks.  Increased competition from foreign entrants stimulates the efficiency of both 
foreign and domestic players in the market. Fears that foreign entrants will take over 
and dominate the host country’s banking sector are unsubstantiated, as studies show that 
foreign banks tend to focus on niche markets that complement rather than substitute for 
services and products offered by domestic banks.  Thus, domestic financial institutions 
will continue to play a crucial role in the financial system in Asia. 
In addition to the benefits of an improved financial infrastructure and increased 
efficiency in the banking sector, foreign banks contribute to the stability of the financial 
sector.  They tend to be more internationally diversified than their domestic 
counterparts, rendering them less sensitive to macroeconomic conditions in the host 
country.  Thus, they are able to provide credit when domestic banks cannot, helping to 
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smooth out business cycle fluctuations.  The experience of Latin America in 1994-1995 
shows that foreign banks can play an important role in recapitalizing the banking sector 
following banking crises.  This trend has also been seen more recently in post-crisis 
Asia.  More importantly, research has shown that by diversifying the host country’s 
banking system overall, international banks actually reduce the likelihood of crisis in 
the first place.   
One caveat, however, is that the mode of foreign entry matters.  Until recently, 
almost all foreign entry into the banking sectors of Asian countries has been through 
offshore lending institutions or branching, rather than through fully-owned subsidiaries 
or majority-owned joint ventures.  There is clear evidence that offshore lending is much 
more volatile than lending by “brick and mortar” foreign banks.  Lending by branches, 
subsidiaries and joint venture banks may have supervisory advantages as well.  As 
witnessed during the Asian crisis, offshore lending tends to be more difficult for the 
host country supervisor to monitor or influence (Peek and Rosengren (2000b)).  
Although empirical studies on the relative merits of foreign bank branches versus 
subsidiaries are limited, recent studies suggest that foreign bank subsidiaries are able to 
provide a wider range of financial services (Clarke and Sanches (2001), Miller and 
Parkhe (1998)), thereby contributing to stability.  Indeed, the data presented in this 
study indicate that subsidiary lending is more stable than that of foreign bank branches.   
In summary, Asian countries stand poised to gain much from the entry of 
foreign financial institutions in the coming years.  However, to fully realize these gains, 
policymakers need to welcome the entry of foreign financial institutions and move away 
from offshore institutions and branch-based entry, allowing foreign players to enter via 
fully owned subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
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Appendix:  List of Financial Institutions Used in the Analysis 
Indonesia 
 
1. Private National Domestic Banks14 
Bank Artah Graha 
Bank Bali (IBRA) 
Bank Buana Indonesia 
Bank Bukopin (Recapitalized by State of Indonesia) 
Bank Bumi Arta 
Bank Central Asia (IBRA) 
Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk (IBRA) 
Bank Ekonomi Rahardja 
Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk (IBRA) 
Bank Keaswan 
Bank Lippo Tbk (IBRA) 
Bank Mayapada Internasional 
Bank Metro Express 
Bank Niaga 
Bank Nusantara Parahyangan 
Bank Prima Express (Recapitalized by State of Indonesia) 
Bank Shinta Indonesia 
Bank Universal (Recapitalized by State of Indonesia) 
 
a. Joint (Minority Foreign Owned) Banks15 
Bank Ficonesia (25% DE, 0.49% US) 
Bank Inter-Pacific (20% JP, 12% FR) 
P.T. Bank CIC Internasional, Tbk (25% US) 
Panin Bank - Pan Indonesia Bank (29% AU) 
 
2. Majority Foreign-Owned Banks16 
ANZ Panin Bank 
Bank BNP Paribas (99.98% FR) 
Bank Credit Lyonnais Indonesia (97% FR) 
Bank Daiwa Perdania (48% JP) 
Bank Fuji International Indonesia (80% JP) 
Bank Keppel Tat Lee Buana (85% SG) 
Bank Multicor (90% GB) 
                                                 
14 Data for Bank Antardaerah, Bank Arta Niaga Kencana, Bank Artamedia, Bank Bumiputera Indonesia, 
Bank Ganesha, Bank Indo Monex, Bank Internasional Indonesia, Bank Maspion Indonesia, Bank Mega 
TBK, Bank Mestika Dharma, Bank Nisp, Bank Nusa Internasional, Bank Nusantara Parahyangan, Bank 
Pikko, Bank Royal Indonesia, Bank UIB and Bank Unibank, were unavailable in Bankscope for either 
1996 or 1998. 
15 Data for Bank Mashill Utama (18% BE) were not available in Bankscope for 1998. 
16 Data were not avaialable in Bankscope for 1996 or 1998 for some banks: Bank Chinatrust Indonesia 
(99% TW), Bank Commonwealth (99% AU), Bank DBS Indonesia, Bank Hanvit Indonesia (82% KR), 
Bank Maybank Indocorp (91% MY) and ING Indonesia Bank (85% NL). 
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Bank OCBC-NISP (85% SG) 
Bank Paribas - BBD Indonesia (88% FR) 
Bank Rabobank International Indonesia (96% NL) 
Bank Sakura Swadharma 
Bank Societe Generale Indonesia (100% FR) 
Bank Sumitomo Mitsui Indonesia (98% JP) 
Bank UOB Indonesia (80% SG) 
IBJ Indonesia Bank (85% JP) 
Indonesia Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (85% JP) 
Indosuez Indonesia Bank 
Korea Exchange Bank Danamon (85% KR) 
Tokai Lippo Bank 
 
3. Foreign Bank Branches 
ABN Amro 
American Express Bank 
Bangkok Bank Ltd. 
Bank Merincorp 
Bank Multicor 
Bank of America 
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Citibank N.A. 
Deutsche Bank AG 
HSBC 
 
Korea 
 
1. Nationwide Domestic Banks17 (11) 
Chohung Bank18 
H&CB 
Hana Bank19 
Hanvit Bank20 
Seoul Bank21 
Shinhan Bank 
Peace Bank of Korea 
 
a. Joint (Minority Foreign Owned) Banks 
Kookmin Bank (11% Goldman Sachs 5% Bank of New York, 2% Government of 
Singapore) 
                                                 
17 All nationwide domestic banks are privately owned unless temporarily nationalized due to low capital. 
18 80% owned by Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation as part of a recapitalization plan. 
19 Absorbed Boram Bank. 
20 Formed by the merger of 2 commercial banks and some local banks, then nationalized by the 
government for recapitalization.  Currently 95% owned by State of Korea. 
21 Nationalized.  Currently 98% owned by Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
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Korea Exchange Bank (32% German owned) 
Koram Bank (40% JP Morgan, 10% Bank of America, 11% private foreign 
shareholders) 
 
2. Local Domestic Banks (6) 
Cheju Bank 
Daegu Bank 
Jeonbuk Bank 
Kwangju Bank 
Kyongnam Bank 
Pusan Bank 
 
3. Majority Foreign-Owned Banks 
Korea First Bank (51% Newbridge Capital as of 1999) 
 
4. Foreign Bank Branches 
ABN Amro 
Algemene Bank Netherland NV. 
American Express Bank Ltd. (2) 
Arab Bank Ltd. 
Asahi Bank 
Australia and New Zealand Bank 
Bank Mellate 
Bank of America 
Bank of California, Bank 
Bank of China 
Bank of Hawaii 
Bank of Montreal 
Bank of New York (2) 
Bank of Nova Scotia 
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi 
Bank One 
Bankers Trust Company 
Banque Indosuez 
Banque National De Paris 
Banque Paribas 
Barclays Bank Ltd. (2) 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Citibank (16) 
Credit Agricole Indosuez 
Credit Lyonnais 
Credit Lyonnais (2) 
Credit Suisse First Boston Bank 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank 
Daiwa Bank 
Deutche Bank 
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Development Bank of Singapore 
First Interstate Bank of California 
First National Bank of Boston 
First National Bank of Boston 
First Union National Bank 
Fleet National Bank 
Fuji Bank 
HSBC (6) 
Indian Overseas Bank 
Industrial and Commercial Bank 
ING Barings 
International Bank of Singapore 
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 
Metrobank 
Mitsubishi Trust Banking 
Mitsui Bank Ltd. 
Morgan Bank 
National Australia Bank Ltd. 
National Bank of Canada 
National Bank of Pakistan 
National Westminster Bank PLC 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Sanwa Bank 
Security Pacific National Bank 
Security Pacific National Bank 
Societe Generale 
Standard Chartered Bank 
State Street Bank 
Sumitomo Bank Ltd. 
Tokai Bank 
UBS Warburg 
Union Bank of California 
Union De Banques Arabes Et Francais 
United Overseas Bank Ltd. 
Westpac Banking Corp. 
Yamaguchi Bank 
 
Malaysia 
 
1. Domestic Commercial Banks 
Affin Bank Berhad 
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 
Arab Malaysian Bank Berhad 
Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad 
Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad 
EON Bank Berhad 
Hong Leong Bank Berhad 
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International Bank Malaysia Bhd 
Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank 
Public Bank Berhad 
Southern Bank Berhad22 
Wah Tat Bank Berhad 
 
a. Joint (Minority Foreign Owned) Banks 
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Berhad (45% SG) 
 
2. Majority Foreign-Owned Commercial Banks 
ABN Amro Bank Behad (100% NL) 
Bangkok Bank Behad (100% TH) 
Bank of America (Malaysia) Berhad 
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad (100% CA) 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Malaysia) Berhad 
Chase Manhattan Bank (M) Berhad (100% US) 
Citibank Berhad (100% US) 
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Berhad (100% US) 
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 
OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad (87% SG) 
Overseas Union Bank (Malaysia) Berhad (100% SG) 
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad (100% NL) 
 
Thailand 
 
1. Domestic Commercial Banks23 
Bangkok Bank PCL 
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank 
BankThai 
Siam City Bank 
 
2. Majority Foreign-Owned Commercial Banks 
Bank of Asia PCL (79% ABN Amro) 
DBS Thai Danu Bank PCL (50.3% Development Bank of Singapore as of 1999) 
Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank PCL (75% Standard Chartered as of 1999) 
UOB Radanasin Bank PCL (75% UOB of Singapore as of 1999) 
 
3. Branches Foreign Bank24 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Citibank, N.A. 
The Hongkong Shangai Banking Corp. (HSBC) 
Standard Chartered Bank 
                                                 
22 8% Keppel Capital Holdings of Singapore. 
23 Bangkok Bank of Commerce, Bank of Ayudhya, Krung Thai Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, Thai 
Farmers Bank and Thai Military Bank loan data were not available for 1996 and/or 1998. 
24 Loan data for other bank branches are not available in the CEIC data base: ABN Amro, American 
Express, Bank of America, Bank of China, Bank of New York, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Tokyo 
Mitsubishi, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Credit Agricole Indosuez, CSFB, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, 
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Industrial Bank of Japan, Sakura Bank, Sumitomo Bank. 
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